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Abstract 
 
During the last 30 years, the Republicans have become an interesting assortment of 
economic, international, and social conservatism, with each leg of the triad having more 
prominence at distinct times.  Examining key votes throughout this period, we assess how the 
most recent converts to the party, those from Southern states, align with Republicans from other 
regions on each of these three dimensions.  We also estimate the relative importance of each of 
the three dimensions annually during this period.  Finally, we examine whether the unstable 
equilibrium that haunted the Congressional Democrats through the first half of the Cold War era 
has merely found a new resting place in the Republican Party.  In order to analyze these issues, 
we analyze House roll call votes from 1975 - 2000 to determine how closely Southern and non-
Southern Republicans are aligned.  Next, we examine various issue dimensions, determining 
how party cohesion is affected when different sets of issues take on greater legislative 
importance.  Our findings confirm that issue dimensions affect party cohesion and that regional 
differences are an important distinction when analyzing House Republicans in a modern context. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
Franklin Roosevelt put together a motley collection of Northern blacks, union members, 
Southern whites, and assorted ethnic and immigrant groups to form a powerful alliance within 
the Democratic Party.  Following World War II, as the civil rights issue began becoming more 
prominent, this coalition that had made the Democratic Party successful began to splinter.  By 
the mid-1960's, soon after the passage of landmark civil rights legislation, white Southern 
politicians began migrating to the Republican Party in search of a more hospitable environment 
for their views.  The civil rights reforms enabled the Republican Party to make inroads into the 
Southern states, which, since the beginning of the century, had been under the control of the 
Democrats.  Around the same period, a strong middle class was also developing in the region due 
to a decreasing dependence on agriculture as economic centers developed.  This had two effects: 
(1) an increase in the potential constituent base for the party and, (2) a reduction in the power of 
northeastern business interests within Republican policy circles. Thus, the Democratic coalition 
had been torn apart. But, as the more conservative elements of their opposition joined them, 
would the Republicans be able to avoid the same fate? 
In this research, we seek to determine whether Republicans in the House of 
Representatives have become less cohesive during the last 25 years.  Then, we analyze if the 
difference in emphasis placed upon three separate issue dimensions (defense/international, 
economic/trade, domestic/social) affects Republican Party cohesion.  Finally, we analyze various 
factors that may cause some Republicans to defect from the majority party position in the post-
reform era. 
 
 CHANGES IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY COALITION 
American political parties at the Congressional level tend to represent the interests of the 
districts in which their members serve (Frymer, 1999).  This is shown in various ways.  First, 
when campaigning, candidates are free to minimize the national party positions if it will better 
enable them to be selected by the voters (Fenno, 1978).  Second, party leaders generally permit 
representatives to vote on policy issues to please their constituents (Mayhew, 1974).  Third, 
representatives have great latitude in determining their preferred committee assignments, based 
upon their district’s interests, their own areas of expertise, or special policy concerns to which 
they are attracted.  Until the 1960’s, this autonomy permitted Southern Democrats in the House 
of Representatives to stall virtually all civil rights legislation (Polsby, 1968). 
For two decades, beginning in the 1940s, representatives from both parties attempted to 
pass civil rights legislation, but were generally thwarted through the efforts of powerful 
committee chairmen, who generally were Southern Democrats.  As the public became more 
sensitive to the concerns of African-Americans, Democratic Party leaders sought ways to enact 
bills over the objections of their erstwhile allies.  The assassination of John F. Kennedy and the 
1964 election provided them with the opportunity.  Non-Southern Democrats joined with 
Republicans to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the 1968 Fair 
Housing Act (Carmines & Stimson, 1989).   
The 1964 Civil Rights Act, the first major civil rights measure of the century, was 
successfully shepherded through Congress as a result of Lyndon Johnson’s legislative acumen.  
It barred discrimination in public facilities, allowed the federal government to act to stop 
segregated public schools, and prohibited job discrimination based upon race.  This was a major 
 signal by the federal government that it intended to be an influential player in the civil rights 
arena (Carmines & Stimson, 1989). 
That same year, Barry Goldwater, one of the few senators outside of the South to vote 
against the bill, won the Republican presidential nomination.  The Republican platform instituted 
at the national convention refused to call for strengthening weak areas of the bill.  Due to the 
1964 campaign, African-Americans were driven into the Democratic camp, and some Southern 
whites began viewing the Republicans as a harbor of refuge from governmental intrusion 
(Carmines & Stimson, 1989).  The following year, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 cemented both 
of these attitudes.  It gave the federal government the power to supervise voter registration in 
seven Southern states.  This led to a vast increase in the percentage of African-Americans who 
were eligible to vote in those states, and made the linkages to the Republicans stronger among 
potential constituents, especially white Southerners (Carmines & Stimson, 1989).  Housing 
access was the third major civil rights bill passed during Johnson’s presidency.  This was a much 
more problematic policy issue to most Republican legislators from other regions, since it would 
affect their own constituents as well as those in the South.   
The passage of civil rights legislation led to increasing cohesiveness among the 
Democratic representatives.  Their unification was driven by three main forces.  First, many of 
the more conservative members abandoned the party, and joined the Republicans.  Second, the 
increase in African-American voters in Southern districts induced many of the Democratic 
House members who remained in the party to become responsive to this new electoral 
constituency.  Finally, representatives felt pressure from party leaders to accept civil rights 
proposals such as affirmative action, opposition to apartheid, and extended voting rights (Rohde, 
1991).  
  
GROWTH OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN THE SOUTH 
Since the end of World War II, the Republican Party in the House has been engaged in an 
internecine debate between its moderate and conservative wings.  Two policy domains, reaction 
to New Deal initiatives and foreign policy, framed the distinctions between the factions for the 
first twenty years.  For domestic policies, conservatives sought a return to free-market principles 
while moderates agreed with the social welfare agenda begun with Franklin D. Roosevelt.  In 
foreign policy, conservative Republicans basically promoted an isolationist policy, except for 
anticommunist deterrence, but moderate interventionists supported foreign alliances and reduced 
tariffs.  Both factions supported civil rights legislation and tended to have laissez faire attitudes 
toward personal behavior issues as well (Rae, 1994). 
During the 1960’s, the competition for control of the Republican Party between the two 
factions remained close.  However, early in the 1970’s, as civil rights laws began to be seen as 
more intrusive to business and suburban interests, through affirmative action and equal 
employment initiatives, much of the Republican support for civil rights began to wane.  Soon 
after, conservative Christians began consolidating their position in the Republican Party, and 
many politicians soon reflected this constituent position (Rae, 1994).   
Within Congress, the moderate wing was further weakened due to redistricting that 
tended to increase the number of legislators from the South, Southwest, and West, while 
reducing the number of moderates representing states from the North and the Midwest.  As their 
faction grew weaker, many of them resigned rather than fight a losing battle for prominence 
within a minority party (Rae, 1994).  Table 1 (and Figure 1) makes clear that the proportion of 
 Republican House members that represent the 11 Southern states1 has steadily increased 
over the period of analysis, from 18.75% of Republican members during the 94th Congress to 
32.0% by the 106th Congress.  As stated earlier, this has been caused by a variety of forces, 
including the effects of the Civil Rights laws of the 1960s in developing a two-party system in 
the South, the increase in manufacturing in Southern states, the nationalization of Presidential 
campaigns, and the influence of the Religious Right in the Republican Party. 
The passage of civil rights legislation led to a change in the terms of engagement as the 
two parties began realigning.  The South became much more responsive to Republican 
candidates as many former legislators led their constituents away from the Democrats.  Recently, 
House Republicans from Southern states have become much more likely to secure leadership 
positions than are those from other regions.  Prior to the 100th Congress there was virtually no 
difference between Southerners and those from other regions in the likelihood of a Republican 
Congressman holding a leadership position.  However, beginning with the 101st Congress 
Republican leadership posts have gravitated to the South.  Evidence of this is most clearly 
displayed in the Republican Southern troika (Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey, and Tom Delay) in 
place when they took over control of the House in 1995 (104th Congress). In addition, since the 
1996 elections, the South has been the only region where Republicans hold a majority of House 
seats. This has led to a further weakening in the power of the moderate faction, generally located 
in New England, the Middle Atlantic and the Midwest.  Cleavages between the camps have 
arisen on a variety of issues, including abortion, civil liberty, law and order, and free trade (Rae, 
1994). 
                                                                 
1 We categorized ‘South’ as the following states:  Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. These are the states that constituted the 
Confederacy. 
 Southern politics has transformed dramatically since the enactment of the 1965 Civil 
Rights Act. Most notable have been the emergence of a competitive two-party system and 
greater electoral participation by African-Americans (Fleisher, 1993). These changes have 
resulted in the recent emergence of a Republican majority in the South and the substantial 
liberalization in the voting behavior of Southern Democratic members of Congress (Fleisher, 
1993).  The percentage of seats located in this region held by the Republicans has steadily grown 
from 21.4% in the 94th Congress to 56.3% in the 106th Congress.  
The liberalization of Southern House Democrats has been linked to a spatial perspective 
(Hood, Kidd, and Morris, 1999; Hood and Morris, 1998). The first aspect of this centers on the 
leftward pull of a growing liberal constituency as a result of the mobilization of an African-
American electorate and the growth of many urban areas in the South. The second focuses on the 
rightward push of a growing and substantial Republican Party in the region that permitted 
conservative candidates another option more amenable to their own beliefs. 
 
REPUBLICAN PARTY FACTIONS 
Typically, analysts (see Rohde, 1991) divide the modern Republican Party into three 
factions.  The largest and most long lasting of these is considered the Traditional Conservative 
faction.  These members are those who tried to ally themselves with Southern Democrats in 
opposition to most measures proposed by the Democratic leadership (when the Democrats 
controlled the House), and who now form the base of support within the current slim Republican 
majority.  Their views include a limited role domestically for the federal government, a strong 
national defense, and reduced deficits. 
 The Moderate faction has, as stated earlier, had long-lasting disagreements with the 
Traditional Conservatives.  They are predominantly located in the Northeast.  Their share of 
Republicans in the House has fallen from about a third to less than one-fourth since the civil 
rights reforms of the 1960’s.  They differ from the other factions on domestic social issues, and 
believe the federal government has responsibilities in other domestic areas, such as education 
and transportation (Rohde, 1991). 
The New Conservative faction was begun in the late 1970’s by a group of newcomer 
conservative Republicans under the leadership of Newt Gingrich.  They believe in a strong 
national defense, governmental policies that stimulate economic growth, a reduction in federal 
intrusion in domestic affairs, and support for traditional family values.  Their main disagreement 
with Traditional Conservatives is that they favor tax cuts, while old- line Conservatives favor 
reducing the budget deficit (Rohde, 1991).  
 
PARTY COHESION 
Members must keep many goals in mind when they cast their votes on bills. Fenno 
(1973) asserts that the most widely held and significant objectives of congressmen are re-
election, influence within the House, and good public policy.  In order to achieve these ends, 
they try not to offend their constituents by voting against their wishes since they need their 
electoral support.  Kingdon (1989) adds that members base their votes on the degree of conflict 
between interested groups, the electoral salience of an issue, and the relative weight of these 
goals in their decision process.  
Based on the above arguments, representatives have incentives for supporting the 
preferences of party leaders.  First, congressional parties influence and support each of the goals 
 of their party members by providing considerable financial and professional assistance that 
help members achieve their electoral goals (Butler, 2000).  Likewise, parties can affect the 
probability of an incumbent facing a primary challenge by either withholding or granting them 
political and financial support.  Second, the party has the ability to grant committee 
appointments, increasing the influence of loyal members. Third, since most members choose the 
party closer to their own preferred policy position on most issues, they have an important stake 
in the success of the legislative policies of the party. 
Party loyalty is also bolstered because representatives often look to fellow party members 
for a number of voting cues, due to specialization norms, areas of expertise, and reciprocity.  
Likewise, most of the member’s friends in Congress are likely to be members of the same party 
and these personal links create a sense of loyalty to their associates, and through them, to the 
party (Clapp, 1966; Kingdon, 1989).  Thus, party leaders usually count on a high degree of 
loyalty unless there are strong constituent or personal reasons to oppose the party position 
(Rieselbach, 1995). 
Finally, party resources may also be used to increase cohesion since the party elites, who 
control the resources, benefit from a stronger, more cohesive party. It is important for voters as 
well that political party elites have a high level of cohesiveness, otherwise they are unable to cast 
votes that reflect their ideal positions.  If a party lacks a high degree of homogeneity, in the eyes 
of voters, their options become problematic and they become less likely to vote. 
 
PARTY COHESION VS. PARTY UNITY 
Let us briefly examine the difference between party cohesion and another more widely 
used term, party unity.  The latter refers to those votes where a majority of Democrats vote in the 
 opposite direction of the majority of Republicans.  Party cohesion, though, examines how 
the majority of a given party votes on some set of issues, and then analyzes causes of cohesion or 
conflict. 
Party cohesion has been investigated in different ways.  Coleman (1996), for example, 
measured party cohesion by analyzing all budget-related roll call votes in the House of 
Representatives.  Rohde (1991) preferred to look at all votes cast in the House of 
Representatives, and subdivided them into party unity and non-party unity votes.   Patterson and 
Caldeira (1988) examined how party platform, divided government, turnover, and split districts 
affected party coherence and conflict. 
We prefer to measure party coherence by examining presidential support votes, then 
subdividing these measures into different issue dimensions.  There are five fundamental reasons 
for using presidential support votes when examining coherence.  First, presidential support votes 
generally represent the major roll call votes and issues addressed in each Congress.  Secondly, a 
substantial group of researchers has found a linkage between the congressional agenda and the 
president (Sundquist, 1981; Kingdon, 1984; Light, 1983).  Thirdly, researchers have generally 
found that the President’s program substantially influences the congressional agenda (see 
Patterson & Caldeira, 1988).  Fourth, the president is the de facto leader of his party, thus 
inducing fe llow members to acquiesce to his goals.  Finally, the president is expected to create a 
national consensus; thus, he has the greatest incentive to promote party cohesion. 
 
INFLUENCES ON PARTY COHESION  
 The following section provides a discussion of the factors we hypothesize influence 
levels of individual representative’s party cohesion. We begin by briefly discussing the influence 
 of various political factors on party cohesion. We then examine the influence of economic, 
domestic, and defense issue dimensions on representatives’ levels of party cohesion. 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Majority Party President 
When one party controls both the presidency and the Congress (in our study, 1977-1980, 
1993-94), there is expected to be more of a linkage between party coherence and presidential 
support, since there will be an increase in majority party coherence, leading to an increase in 
minority party coherence. 
Minority Party President 
When there is divided control, the president’s agenda is expected to have less of an effect 
upon party coherence, since he is required to negotiate with the majority party over various 
alternatives (Rieselbach, 1996).  Bond & Fleisher (1990) state that ‘the opposition party bases 
are more likely to unite in opposition to the president on important votes.’  This is caused by the 
tendency of cross-pressured bases to induce ideological behavior against the president when the 
representative is of the same party as the president.  However, the ideologies tend to unite in 
opposition to a president of the opposition party (pp105-106). 
Party Leadership 
Party leaders are expected to have high levels of cohesion.  They may have attained 
leadership positions originally because of their loyalty to the party (Rieselbach, 1995).  More 
importantly, perhaps, they are part of the agenda-setting action within the party and are expected 
to promote winning coalitions.  Therefore, they are likely to have discipline imposed upon them 
if they reject the party’s majority position (Davidson & Oleszak, 1996). 
 POLICY FACTORS 
We anticipate that issue dimensions should differ in the amount of party cohesion.  Some 
policy areas are widely agreed upon by party members, while others remain quarters of great 
conflict. Within some domains, members cede greater autonomy to party leaders.  In others, they 
are less amenable at relinquishing control (LeLoup, 1993). We have divided the issue space into 
three separate dimensions: economic/trade, domestic/social, and defense/foreign policy,.   
Economic Issues 
Since the beginning of our nation’s history, economic and trade issues have been 
important in framing differences between parties (Poole & Rosenthal, 1997).  Included within 
this domain are broad concerns such as budgetary issues, tax policy, and international trade.  
While the other domains may maintain some consistency within a party for short periods, 
eventually intra-party splits usually develop due to constituency pressures.  But, since voters 
maintain allegiance to the parties through the fiscal and monetary policies that define them, there 
has usually been a consistency in economic issues that defines legislative voting.  Since the 
parties remain divided basically over the issue of income redistribution, it seems natural that 
those who categorize themselves as Republicans would generally take like-minded positions 
within this domain.  Therefore, we expect that, for Republicans during the period of our study, 
party cohesion should remain highest in the economic dimension.   
Domestic Issues 
We expect that domestic issues will prove to be the least coherent among the different 
domains.  Policy disputes in this domain are among the most intense that arise in our political 
system.  Issues in this arena many times have an undercurrent question of fairness and social 
justice that causes actors and constituents to become highly emotional.  Because of the intensity 
 of feelings surrounding potential action, many legislators, particularly those in competitive 
districts, are particularly concerned with how their roll-call records will affect re-election 
campaigns.  Cleavages that arise may center over the role of governmental responsibility and 
individual rights (LeLoup, 1993).  Included within this domain is legislation affecting issues on a 
variety of topics, including abortion, crime, the environment, and civil rights. 
Defense Issues 
Since World War II, the defense/foreign policy domain has undergone three major 
periods: the early Cold War, the Vietnam War and its aftermath, and the post-Cold War.  The 
first of these periods, which lasted for about twenty years after the end of World War II, saw 
issues arise such as the containment of Communism and the desirability and nature of nuclear 
defense.  Much policy in this early phase was bipartisan and consensus-driven. During the 
second stage, the Vietnam War and its aftermath, disputes centered around issues such as the 
desirability of American intervention in foreign conflicts, human rights, and limiting the 
influence of the Soviet Union.  Disputes became more common as questions of strategy 
supplanted the earlier harmony.  During the third phase, the post-Cold War period, the heart of 
disputes among political elites has been about issues such as the differing diplomatic and military 
needs and the appropriate levels of defense spending given different fiscal restraints. Our study, 
which covers the latter part of the second phase listed above and the early part of the third, cover 
periods where Congress has become increasingly influential in the determination of policies 
(LeLoup, 1993). 
Table 2 makes clear how the patterns of presidential support issues have changed by 
domain over the period of this study.  Let us consider why these patterns may exist.  First, we see 
that Democratic presidents have an average of 187 presidential support votes per Congress.  
 When Republicans are president, though, there is an average of only 151.4 presidential 
support votes in each Congress.  Another interesting feature is that during the Congress that 
includes a presidential election year, there is an average of 173.8 presidential support votes, 
while in the alternative Congress there is only 153 presidential support votes.  This pattern holds 
for each presidential term that we studied with the smallest difference occurring between Bush’s 
first and second Congress (17 votes), and the largest difference during Reagan’s second term (76 
votes). 
When we examine the differences by domains, we also see some features that bear 
comment.  First, let us look at the economic issues.  Here we see that in the first two Congresses, 
covering Ford’s final two years in office and Carter’s first two years, the percentage of 
presidential support bills devoted to economic issues was very low.  For the next four Congresses 
(from 1979-1986), the percentage of presidential support bills rose dramatically.  Here we may 
be seeing how the federal institutions reacted to the stagflation of the late 70’s and the recession 
of the early 80’s.  As well, many of Reagan’s initiatives in the economic domain were devoted to 
his efforts to reduce taxes.  Then, once again, as the economy calmed, presidential support bills 
were reduced for the next two terms.  We see the pattern replicated again, as during the final two 
years of Bush’s presidency and Clinton’s first two years (1993-94), in response to the recession,  
the share of economic bills increased substantially.  Since then, as the national economy grew 
steadily, the percentage of bills devoted to the economy fell. 
For defense bills, we see that the percentage was very low in the first two Congresses of 
our study.  This was probably a reaction to the end of the Vietnam War, and the anti-war feelings 
that were pervasive during that period.  Then, for the next four Congresses, presidential support 
share of defense bills increased or remained stable.  This covered the period of the Iran hostage 
 incident, and Reagan’s defense buildup.  Since then, as the Cold War wound down and later, 
follwoing the elimination of the Soviet bloc, defense bills have steadily decreased. 
For domestic bills, we see that in the first few Congresses, the percentage of bills dealing 
with domestic issues was very high.  Then, during the next two Congresses, covering Carter’s 
final two years and Reagan’s initial Congress, the percentage of domestic issues dropped 
drastically. Congressional Quarterly (1982) states that this decline was probably because support 
scores are based only upon bills that reach a roll-call vote on the House floor. Since the House 
leadership disagreed with much of Carter’s and Reagan’s domestic agenda, few of the elements 
that the White House promoted actually reached the House floor. Then, other than the 99th 
Congress, the distribution of domestic issues has remained high.  Thus, the share of domestic 
issues is a response generally to the share committed to the other two domains. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
As stated earlier, we measure party cohesion in a slightly different way than previous 
scholars.  Rather than examining all votes in a Congress, many of which were 
procedural/administrative, we analyze only Presidential Support votes (as provided by 
Congressional Quarterly), which we contend include the ‘important’ roll-call votes of each 
Congress.  As noted above, presidents are the primary agenda setters in national public policy. 
Thus, analyzing Presidential Support votes examines those opportunities members have to show 
support or opposition in avenues that are likely to garnish more public notice (Rieselbach, 1996). 
For the 100th through 106th Congresses, we used the issue dimensions provided by 
Congressional Quarterly.  Because CQ did not define the issue dimensions of Presidential 
Support votes prior to the 100th Congress, we were required to determine the issue dimensions 
 ourselves.  We made every effort to maintain consistency with the coding provided by 
Congressional Quarterly (but, of course, are responsible for all errors)2.  Then, for each vote, we 
coded the majority Republican position as 100, and the minority position as 0.  We then 
determined a mean score for each member for each Congress, overall and on each of the three 
dimensions 3.  Thus, a Republican House member, who within a particular Congress voted with 
the majority of his party on each of the important votes, would have a mean of 100 overall. 
We examine tendencies in Presidential support votes by issue domain over the period of our 
study to see if there have been any trends between domestic, economic, and defense bills, and 
interpret these shifts in emphasis.  We then employ OLS regression to examine whether variables 
that have been thought to be theoretically important are empirically meaningful.  Our 
explanatory variables include: 
• Leadership – defined as Speaker, Majority/Minority Leader, Whips, and Deputy Whips. 
• Republican President – defined as Congresses during the presidencies of Ford, Reagan, 
and Bush (Sr). 
• Majority President – defined as presidents who served while the House of 
Representatives had a majority of the same party.  This includes Carter’s presidency and 
Clinton’s first Congress. 
To these variables, we add a regional context by examining our hypothesis that Southern 
Republican representatives have a different cohesion level than do their counterparts from other 
regions.  We then consider our hypothesis that different issue domains have divergent effects 
upon party coherence in a multivariate analysis. 
 
                                                                 
2 A list of roll-call votes for each dimension is available from the authors. 
 DATA ANALYSIS 
Is there any difference in voting behavior between the Southern Republican legislators 
and those representing other regions?  We see, in Tables 3 through 6 (and in Figure 2), the 
difference over issue dimensions by regional representation.  Table 3 examines domestic issues.  
We found that the means for the two regions remain relatively close until the 99th Congress then 
diverge in the following Congresses, with Southern Republicans much more likely to vote with 
the majority of their party. 
On the other hand, Table 4, which examines the votes on economic issues, by region, 
shows that whatever differences there were between Southern and Non-Southern Republicans 
occurred in the earlier Congresses which we studied but that, since the 101st Congress, 
Republican representatives tended to vote similarly, regardless of region. 
In Table 5 we see that Southern Republicans are much more likely to vote with members 
of their party on defense issues than are those from other regions.  Although we had not posited 
the relationship between Southern Republicans and those from other regions in regard to defense 
issues, it is fairly obvious why there would be a difference based on region of the legislator.  
First, Southern constituents tend to favor a strong national defense.  Second, and probably related 
to the first reason, a much higher proportion of Southerners have served in the military or have 
family members with a military background.  Third, many military bases are located in the 
Southern states (for example, 10 of the 22 army bases on American soil are located in the eleven 
Southern states).  Thus, it would be more natural for a non-Southern legislator to defect from the 
party position than a Southerner. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 All cohesion scores will be available from the author’s website and the ICPSR public archive following 
publication. 
  Finally, we view in Table 6 all of the issue dimensions in tandem with each other.  
Here we see that in all of the Congresses, non-southerners were substantially more likely to 
defect from the majority Republican position than were their Southern counterparts. 
We then conducted correlation analyses between the increase in the share of Southern 
Republicans and the difference in party cohesion over each of the three issue domains.  As we 
predicted, in the domestic domain (correlation coefficient = .626), there is a sharp increase in the 
difference in party cohesion as the share of Southern Republicans increases.  For the other two 
domains, the party became more cohesive as the share of Republican legislators from the South 
increased.  Especially for economic issues (correlation coefficient = -.657), the Republican Party 
in the House has spoken with a more unified voice.  But, due to the increase in the proportion of 
domestic issues on the agenda as the share of Southern Republicans has increased, the difference 
in the total party cohesion (.11) has grown. 
We then conducted OLS regression analyses to determine the effects of some of the 
variables we have discussed on the mean cohesion score of a Republican member of the House 
of Representatives in any Congress.  The dependent variable is the mean party cohesion score 
(on a scale of 0-100) arrived at by determining the percentage of votes by a Republican 
representative on important issues that coincided with the majority of voting Republicans.   
In Table 7, we show four regression models.  The independent variables include three 
dichotomous explanatory variables shown in previous research to affect party cohesion, as well 
as our primary independent variable, South.   
The first variable, Leader, is positive and statistically significant in all four models. Its 
substantive significance varies from 1.55 for economic issues to 2.71 for defense concerns. 
Overall, Republican representatives who serve in leadership roles in the House of 
 Representatives are likely to have means 2.08 points higher than other Republican 
representatives, controlling for the other variables.  This fits existing theory nicely (see 
Rieselbach; Davidson and Oleszak, above).   
The variable Republican President/Democratic Majority , with negative coefficients in 
the four models, indicates that when the President is Republican (with a Democratic majority in 
the House), during our period of study (1975-76, 1981-92), Republicans are much less cohesive 
than when the President is Democratic.  This fits with Bond & Fleisher’s analysis that opposition 
parties are much more likely to unify against a president then are members of the president’s 
party to unite in support of him. 
Democratic President/Democratic Majority shows  how Republican cohesion is 
affected when the President is of the same party as the majority in the House (1977-80, 1993-94).  
This variable, with a coefficient of –2.27 matches the theoretical explanations previously given, 
that parties are more likely to be cohesive when the minority party is also the party of the 
president. 
Finally, our key independent variable is South, where, as stated previously, 
representatives from the eleven southern states are coded as 1, all others are coded as 0.  We 
find, as predicted, that there is a noticeable difference in party cohesion scores between these 
southern Republican representatives and those from the other states.  In fact, representatives 
from Southern states had party cohesion scores 4.42 higher than did those from other regions. 
Examining the domain differences, we see that in the defense domain, there is a greater regional 
difference. As we stated in an earlier section, we expected this because of the close relationship 
constituents from southern states are more likely to have with a strong national defense. 
 
 FINDINGS 
During the last twenty-five years, the Republican Party has gone through a major 
geographic change. It has gone from a distinctly diminutive presence in the South to becoming 
the dominant political force in the region. Over the time encompassed by our study, the share of 
Republican House members from the South has increased by more than 50%, with its party share 
increasing in virtually every election. At the same time overall party cohesion has increased in 
spite of these dramatic changes, with the major increase taking place within the domestic 
domain.  
Each of the party variables that previous research had examined proved to be significant, 
and in the correct direction(s).  We have also found that Southern Republican legislators are 
likely to have party cohesion scores much higher than their counterparts from other regions.  
Thus, there are regional differences in party cohesion, even when including other important 
variables. We have also found that Southern Republican legislators, as the party has increased its 
strength in the region, have increasingly become party leaders. 
 We also found that beginning with the 104th Congress, when they took over control of the 
House, Republican cohesion increased measurably. Combining agenda control with the 
exuberance of taking over a political body for which it had waited forty years induced the highest 
cohesion levels since the political turmoil of the 1960’s. As Congressional scholars bemoan the 
increasing power of interest groups, and examine methods to increase the preeminence of 
political parties in elections, it is somehow refreshing to see how the Republicans may have an 
attained an equilibrium centered in the Deep South. 
 TABLE 1 
Share of Republican House Seats Held by Southern Representatives 
Congress Southern Non-Southern 
94th Congress (1975-76) 27 (18.8%) 117 (81.3%) 
95th Congress (1977-78) 28 (19.0%) 119 (81.0%) 
96th Congress (1979-80) 31 (19.4%) 129 (80.6%) 
97th Congress (1981-82) 38 (19.7%) 155 (80.3%) 
98th Congress (1983-84) 35 (21.0%) 132 (79.0%) 
99th Congress (1985-86) 43 (23.6%) 139 (76.4%) 
100th Congress (1987-88) 40 (22.3%) 139 (77.7%) 
101st Congress (1989-90) 40 (22.7%) 136 (77.3%) 
102nd Congress (1991-92) 41 (24.1%) 129 (75.9%) 
103rd Congress (1993-94) 48 (26.8%) 131 (73.2%) 
104th Congress (1995-96) 69 (29.2%) 167 (70.8%) 
105th Congress (1997-98) 71 (30.7%) 160 (69.3%) 
106th Congress (1999-00) 72 (32.0%) 153 (68.0%) 
 
 TABLE 2 
Share of Presidential Support Votes by Domain by Congress 
Congress President Domestic Economic Defense N 
94th Congress  Ford (R) 65.8% 19.5% 14.6% 82 
95th Congress Carter (D) 78.9% 8.7% 12.4% 161 
96th Congress Carter (D) 30.4% 41.2% 28.4% 194 
97th Congress Reagan (R) 33.3% 42.3% 24.3% 111 
98th Congress Reagan (R) 52.0% 29.7% 18.2% 148 
99th Congress Reagan (R) 28.0% 34.7% 37.3% 118 
100th Congress Reagan (R) 45.9% 21.1% 33.0% 194 
101st Congress Bush (R) 54.9% 19.5% 25.6% 195 
102nd Congress Bush (R) 46.2% 29.2% 24.5% 212 
103rd Congress Clinton (D) 54.4% 21.7% 23.9% 180 
104th Congress Clinton (D) 63.4% 12.7% 23.9% 213 
105th Congress Clinton (D) 60.5% 17.1% 22.4% 150 
106th Congress Clinton (D) 47.0% 25.0% 18.0% 100 
Total   51.2% 24.2% 24.1% 2058 
 
 TABLE 3 
Difference in Party Cohesion by Region (Domestic Issues) 
 Congress Non-South South Difference N 
94th Congress  81.7 82.1 .4 54 
95th Congress 83.2 83.7 .5 127 
96th Congress 78.2 78.9 .7 59 
97th Congress 79.6 79.7 .1 37 
98th Congress 80.5 81.1 .6 77 
99th Congress 77.9 80.2 2.3 33 
100th Congress 77.6 78.9 2.3 89 
101st Congress 76.0 77.7 1.7 107 
102nd Congress 77.6 79.5 1.9 98 
103rd Congress 76.6 78.7 2.1 98 
104th Congress 88.0 89.8 1.8 151 
105th Congress 86.4 88.3 1.9 91 
106th Congress 87.2 89.3 2.1 47 
Total 81.0 82.6 1.6 1070 
 TABLE 4 
Difference in Party Cohesion by Region (Economic Issues) 
Congress Non-South South Difference N 
94th Congress  69.2 80.3 11.1 16 
95th Congress 86.2 91.8 5.2 14 
96th Congress 82.6 87.3 4.7 80 
97th Congress 80.0 82.0 2.0 47 
98th Congress 78.5 80.9 2.4 44 
99th Congress 73.6 76.2 2.6 41 
100th Congress 77.5 82.3 4.8 41 
101st Congress 79.5 84.5 5.0 38 
102nd Congress 84.8 86.0 1.2 62 
103rd Congress 86.1 82.3 - 3.8 39 
104th Congress 96.5 97.0 .5 27 
105th Congress 83.5 83.9 .4 26 
106th Congress 86.4 84.3 - 2.1 25 
Total 82.2 85.0 2.8 500 
 
 TABLE 5 
Difference in Party Cohesion by Region (Defense Issues) 
Congress Non-South South Difference N 
94th Congress 73.8 90.7 16.9 12 
95th Congress 80.0 87.4 7.4 20 
96th Congress 85.1 89.2 4.1 55 
97th Congress 86.2 86.8 .6 27 
98th Congress 77.0 84.5 7.5 27 
99th Congress 81.5 88.2 6.7 44 
100th Congress 86.2 93.7 7.5 64 
101st Congress 80.8 89.0 8.2 50 
102nd Congress 81.7 87.7 6.0 52 
103rd Congress 78.3 83.7 5.4 43 
104th Congress 83.4 86.0 2.6 51 
105th Congress 86.6 89.9 3.3 33 
106th Congress 80.3 84.5 4.2 18 
Total 81.9 87.5 5.6 496 
 
 TABLE 6 
Difference in Party Cohesion by Region (All Issues) 
Congress Non-South South Difference 
94th Congress 77.9 84.0 6.1 
95th Congress 83.1 85.9 2.8 
96th Congress 82.0 86.1 4.1 
97th Congress 81.3 82.5 1.2 
98th Congress 79.2 82.6 3.4 
99th Congress 77.8 83.5 5.7 
100th Congress 80.4 86.1 5.7 
101st Congress 77.9 84.3 6.4 
102nd Congress 80.6 85.5 4.9 
103rd Congress 79.1 83.0 3.9 
104th Congress 88.0 91.8 3.8 
105th Congress 86.0 89.8 3.8 
106th Congress 77.0 79.7 2.7 
Total 80.9 85.3 3.4 
 
 
 
 TABLE 7 
Determinants of Party Cohesion 
Variable Domestic Economic Defense Total 
86.93** 87.40** 82.28** 83.24** Constant 
(.45) (.49) (.54) (.40) 
2.07** 1.55** .71** 2.08** Leader 
(.55) (.60) (.66) (.49) 
4.87** 2.72* 5.99** 4.42** Southern States 
(.49) (.54) (.59) (.44) 
-8.64** -9.65** -.99 -4.11** Republican President/ 
Democratic Majority (.50) (.54) (.60) (.44) 
-8.14** -2.63** -1.42 -2.27 Democratic President/ 
Democratic Majority (.61) (.67) (.74) (.54) 
N 2315 2315 2315 2315 
Adjusted R
2
  .180 .155 .056 .096 
Dependent Variable : Mean Party Cohesion score (% of votes by a Republican Representative on important issues 
that coincided with the majority of voting Republicans) 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 
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Figure 2
Difference in Party Cohesion Scores
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